A number of countries have opted to introduce a ban on the use of social media for minors. France enacted a law which has been challenged before the Conseil Constitutionnel. The judgement delivered on the of 14 August 2026 (Conseil constitutionnel’s Decision No. 2026-911 DC) is an eye-opener and an interesting point of reference for any discussion or legislative proposal parliaments may be presented with in relation to the introduction of a social media ban.
French legislation was introduced with a clear intention to protect minors from the risks associated with social networks. Article 1 introduced a new section entitled “Protection des mineurs en ligne” – Protection of minor on line into the Law of 21 June 2004. This amendment established, in principle, a prohibition on access to online social-network services for minors under fifteen.
The legislation had a clear objective namely to protect younger minors from risks associated with social-network services, including addiction, isolation, pornography, harassment and fraud. The Conseil constitutionnel expressly accepted that these were legitimate objectives capable of justifying restrictions on minors’ access to such services. The judgement stated:
« De tels objectifs sont de nature à justifier que le législateur limite la liberté d’accès de mineurs à ces services. »
“Such objectives are capable of justifying legislation limiting minors’ freedom of access to these services.”
The judgment is therefore not a rejection of the objective of the contested legislation to protect children online. Rather, it is a judgment about the constitutional limits of the means chosen to achieve that objective, principally through the requirements of necessity, adaptation and proportionality.
The Court considered that the newly introduced legislation interfered with a constitutionally protected freedom. While referring to Article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the Court held that freedom of communication encompasses access to online communication services:
« ce droit implique la liberté d’accéder à ces services et de s’y exprimer. »
“This right entails the freedom to access these services and to express oneself through them.”
It consequently held:
« Ces dispositions, qui privent ces mineurs de la liberté d’accéder à certains services de communication au public en ligne, portent atteinte à la liberté d’expression et de communication. »
“These provisions, which deprive these minors of the freedom to access certain online public communication services, interfere with freedom of expression and communication.”
Having identified an interference with a protected freedom, the Court applied the established proportionality standard namely that restrictions on freedom of expression and communication must be necessary, adapted and proportionate to the objective pursued.
The first substantive difficulty was the extent of the prohibition. The legislation did not distinguish between services according to their functionality, content, risks or existing safeguards. The Court noted that the prohibition was:
« soumise à aucune condition tenant aux fonctionnalités ou aux contenus proposés, aux dangers auxquels ils exposent, et à l’insuffisance des protections dont ils sont assortis. »
“subject to no condition relating to the functionalities or content offered, the dangers to which they expose users, or the insufficiency of the protections with which they are equipped.”
The consequence, in the Court’s view, was significant:
« l’interdiction instituée est susceptible de s’appliquer à des services de communication en ligne dont les risques pour la santé et la sécurité des mineurs […] ne sont pas établis. »
“the prohibition established is capable of applying to online communication services in respect of which the risks to the health and safety of minors […] have not been established.”
The second issue was the absence of any individualised assessment. The prohibition applied to all minors under fifteen years of age without allowing the particular circumstances of the child or the characteristics of the service to be considered. In particular, parents or legal representatives were not given the ability, in the child’s interests, to lift or limit the prohibition or authorise access to particular services.
The Court stated:
« l’interdiction instituée ne donne lieu à aucune appréciation particulière du risque pour le mineur, tenant compte notamment de son âge, de son degré de maturité, de sa situation familiale ainsi que de la nature du service concerné. »
“The prohibition established does not give rise to any individual assessment of the risk to the minor, taking account in particular of their age, degree of maturity, family circumstances and the nature of the service concerned.”
The Court therefore concluded that Parliament could not constitutionally impose such a blanket prohibition:
« le législateur ne pouvait, sans méconnaître la liberté d’expression et de communication, instituer une interdiction de portée générale »
“the legislature could not, without infringing freedom of expression and communication, establish a prohibition of general scope”
where the prohibition operated:
« sans considération ni de la situation du mineur ni des risques propres à ces services. »
“without regard either to the circumstances of the minor or to the risks specific to those services.”
The conclusion followed:
« les dispositions contestées portent à cette liberté une atteinte qui n’est pas adaptée, nécessaire et proportionnée à l’objectif poursuivi. »
“the challenged provisions interfere with that freedom in a manner that is not appropriate, necessary or proportionate to the objective pursued.”
There was also a distinct privacy concern as a result of the prohibition tied to the age of the minors. The prohibition required a mechanism that necessarily requests users to establish their age. The Court observed that:
« toute personne, même majeure, fasse la preuve de son âge avant d’y accéder. »
“every person, including an adult, prove their age before accessing them.”
Yet Parliament had not sufficiently regulated the conditions and limits of that process:
« Faute de déterminer les conditions et les limites dans lesquelles il devra ainsi en être justifié, le législateur n’a pas prévu les garanties légales de nature à assurer le respect de ces exigences constitutionnelles. »
“By failing to determine the conditions and limits under which such proof would have to be provided, the legislature did not establish the statutory safeguards necessary to ensure compliance with these constitutional requirements.”
The Conseil constitutionnel consequently declared Article 1 unconstitutional.
In conclusion, the significance of the decision lies in its distinction between the legitimacy of protecting minors and the constitutionality of the particular mechanism chosen to achieve this objective. The Court accepted the seriousness of the risks identified by Parliament and its authority to restrict minors’ access to online services yet it rejected the legislative mechanism chosen to achieve the objectives mentioned above. .
The judgment therefore establishes a clear constitutional principle on this matter that definitively requires attention and positive action. The protection of children online may justify restrictions on access to digital services, but those restrictions must maintain a sufficiently close relationship between the risk identified, the service concerned and the circumstances of the individual minor. A blanket prohibition which disregards those distinctions, while also imposing age verification without adequate privacy safeguards, was considered by the Court to go beyond what would be considered as acceptable limitation to the fundamental right to expression.
The ongoing debate in various countries, including Malta, on the introduction of bans or limitation of use of social media by minors needs to continue. However, this judgement is an interesting point of reference that must be taken into consideration in all future deliberations.
